

W. Scott Randolph
Director - Regulatory Affairs



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June 15, 2001

Bruce A. Franca
Acting Chief, Office of Engineering and Technology
Federal Communications Commission
445 Twelfth Street, S.W.
7-C153
Washington, DC 20554


RE: Final Service Disruption Report for May 16, 2001 Event

Dear Mr. Franca,

In accordance with the outage reporting thresholds established in CC Docket 91-273, we are enclosing Verizon's Final Service Disruption Report for the outage affecting the Wakefield, MA area on May 16, 2001.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call me at (202) 515-2530.

Sincerely,



W. Scott Randolph
Director - Regulatory Affairs

Enclosure

cc: R. Kimball
K. Nilsson

WIRE LINE OUTAGE REPORT

Reporting Carrier Verizon	Date of Incident 05/16/2001
Time of Incident 0846 EST	Geographic Area Affected Wakefield, MA
Services Affected IntraLATA Intraoffice <input type="checkbox"/> IntraLATA Interoffice <input type="checkbox"/> InterLATA Interoffice <input type="checkbox"/> E911 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Number of Customers Affected Approximately 2,797,900 Number of Blocked Calls Not available Outage Duration 1 Hrs 22 Min
Background of the Incident <p>On Wednesday, May 16 at 08:46 a translations Central Office Technician (COT) downloaded a software order to "clean-up" the Wakefield Tandem (WKFDMAE1ED) after the implementation of 10-digit dialing associated with the Area Code Overlay. The tandem, a DMS100/200 switch, serves 66 Public Service Answering Points (PSAPs). During the process, an exchange error was encountered in the software order and the translations COT left a voice mail message at 09:16 for Software Provisioning requesting direction concerning this problem. At approximately 09:37, the Service Response Center (SRC) called the COT reporting a 911 problem in Somerville, MA. While this problem was being investigated, the SRC received reports from other towns that were having problems with calls to 911. Customer calls to 911 going through the Wakefield tandem were being routed to announcement trunks rather than to the PSAP. The COT again called the Software Provisioning group and left a message reporting this problem. Software Provisioning worked with the COT to retreat from the software order and restore the original translations in the Wakefield Tandem. By 10:08, E911 service was restored to the affected communities and calls were routed to the appropriate PSAP.</p> <p>Subsequent investigation revealed the software order provided by the Software Provisioning group was incorrect. This order was considered routine in nature and its potential effect on 911 service was not considered.</p>	
Direct Cause Procedural- Service Provider- Followed standard procedures/documentation that were incorrect	
Root Cause Procedural- Service Provider- Documentation/ procedures unavailable/unclear/incomplete	
Name and Type of Equipment Nortel DMS 100/200 Switch	Specific Part of the Network Involved E911 Tandem

Methods Used to Restore Service	
Translations were returned to their original configuration	
Steps Taken to Prevent Recurrence of the Incident	
<p>Verizon will ensure that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Software Provisioning verifies all changes made to E911 routes for accuracy in the PC Codes database. • Software Provisioning continues to develop a mechanized method to verify software change for accuracy. • Treat all software orders affecting E911 as "safe time" critical orders to be implemented in compliance with Verizon's practice. • Any software order that generates an error message will not be installed. • After implementation of software affecting E911, test calls must be made from foreign exchange lines in the Network Operations Center (NOC) to verify that E911 and the emergency network have not been corrupted. • If a routing problem is suspected after a software order has been implemented, the translation technicians will remove the software changes immediately and call the Software Provisioning group for assistance in rectifying the problem 	
Evaluation of Best Practices	
<p>The following Best Practice recommended by the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council IV, Focus Group 3, Subcommittee 1 Final Report consolidating and revising the Best Practices apply to this outage. Procedural (PR) Best Practice, PR32, calls for tests of translations before and after a change to ensure the expected results. This should include the need to test calls to 911.</p>	
Contact Person	Telephone Number of Contact Person
William S. Randolph	202-515-2530

01-063

**VERIZON
FCC NETWORK DISRUPTION
INITIAL REPORT**

TICKET #: ARU-AZE

1. **DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT:** 05/16/2001 09:00:00 AM
2. **GEOGRAPHIC AREA AFFECTED:** North/North eastern MA
3. **MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS AFFECTED:** 50,000
4. **TYPE OF SERVICES AFFECTED:**
☒ EMERGENCY-SERVICE ☐ INTERLATA ☐ OTHER
☐ INTRALATA ☐ 800 SERVICES
5. **DURATION OF OUTAGE:** 01:05:00
6. **ESTIMATED NUMBER OF BLOCKED CALLS:** 0
7A. **TYPE EQUIPMENT:** 911 Tandem - Total **VENDOR:**
7B. **APPARENT OR KNOWN CAUSE OF INCIDENT:**
Software error
8. **METHOD USED TO RESTORE SERVICE:**
Corrected software error
9. **STEPS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:**
Not available at this time

Pursuant to Section 0.459 (b) of the Commission Rules, and for reason set forth below,
confidentiality is requested for items:
Reason for confidentiality:

☐ A Request to supplement the showing requested by section 0.459 (b) is hereby made and will be submitted expeditiously.

Request Supplement:

DATE AND TIME OF REPORT: 05/16/2001 02:52:27 PM

CONTACT AND TELEPHONE #: Michael Pearcc 800-400-4682

NOTE: Retention period is 6 Years